The wealth effects of REIT property acquisitions and dispositions: the creditors’ perspective by Li, Qing et al.
The wealth effects of REIT property 
acquisitions and dispositions: the 
creditors’ perspective 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Li, Q., Ling, D. C., Mori, M. and Ong, S. E. (2018) The wealth 
effects of REIT property acquisitions and dispositions: the 
creditors’ perspective. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics. ISSN 0895­5638 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146­018­9677­9 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/79270/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11146­018­9677­9 
Publisher: Springer 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
0 
 
The Wealth Effects of REIT Property Acquisitions and Dispositions:  
The Creditors’ Perspective 
 
 
 
Abstract Prior studies of REIT property transaction activity focus on shareholder wealth effects. 
This study examines the effects of property acquisitions, dispositions, and overall trading activity 
on unsecured bond spreads, credit rating changes, and rating outlooks using a sample of the listed 
equity REITs in the U.S. We find that active property trading in general decreases creditors’ wealth, 
but this negative impact is significantly mitigated for REITs with positive NAV premiums and 
when REITs use sale proceeds to pay down debt after the transactions. We also find that property 
transactions followed by an increased geographic focus significantly increase bond yield spreads 
and decrease the probability of credit rating upgrades. 
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Introduction  
Property acquisitions and dispositions are a frequent and important corporate activity undertaken 
by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). As a result, a substantial body of literature studies the 
effects of property acquisitions and dispositions on REITs. Most of the studies that investigate 
property transaction activity focus on the effects of property transaction from shareholders’ 
perspective (e.g., Glascock et al. 1991; Mclntosh et al. 1995; Campbell et al. 2003, 2006; Brounen 
et al. 2007; Ooi et al. 2011). In contrast, the effects of property transaction on the wealth of 
creditors have been mostly neglected by the literature. 
To address this gap in the real estate literature, we examine how equity REIT decisions on 
property acquisitions and dispositions affect the wealth of creditors.1 We use corporate bond yield 
spreads and credit rating changes as proxies for debt holders’ wealth. Since bond yields and credit 
ratings affect the cost of debt financing, it is important for corporate managers to understand how 
their corporate decisions affect bond yields and credit ratings (see, e.g., Kisgen 2006).  
The value of REITs is sensitive to the cost of debt financing, because regulations require REITs 
to rely heavily on external funds, including debt to finance their property investments (e.g., Ooi et 
al. 2010; Ong et al. 2011).2 The heavy reliance on external financing may create agency conflicts 
between debt and equity holders along with asset transactions (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 
1977). Due to the potential conflict of interests, the effects of property transactions on debt holders 
can be quite different from the effects on equity holders. In addition, REITs tend to maintain 
significantly higher debt ratios than their non-REIT counterparts (Feng et al. 2007; Li et al. 2014; 
                                                        
1 Equity REITs take ownership positions in commercial real estate. In contrast, mortgage REITs own mortgages or mortgage-
backed securities.  
2 REITs must distribute 90 percent of annual taxable income to remain a qualified REIT. REITs must distribute all of their taxable 
income in the form of dividends to completely avoid taxation at the entity level. These dividend payments constitute 
approximately 70 percent of free cash flow for the typical REIT. 
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Giacomini et al. 2017). Thus, it is essential for REIT managers to understand the relation between 
property transaction decisions and their firms’ credit assessments. 
Our two proxies for debt holders’ wealth are bond yield spreads and credit rating changes. In 
addition to actual credit rating changes (upgrades/downgrades), we also use an intermediate-term 
credit change indicator--rating outlook--as a dependent variable.3 Given that rating agencies are 
often accused of being slow to adjust their ratings (Löffler 2005; Cheng and Neamtiu 2009), we 
expect rating outlooks to capture more timely changes in the perceived credit quality of REITs 
after property transactions. 
In addition to examining the effects of property transactions on bond yield spreads and credit 
rating changes, we also investigate the underlying economic channels that can explain the relation 
between property transaction and creditor’s wealth. We focus on three hypotheses. First, the 
Efficient Asset Allocation Hypothesis refers to the idea that some REITs may be perceived to have 
better management skills and are able rebalance their REIT portfolios more efficiently. We use the 
firm’s net asset value (NAV) premium as the Efficient Asset Allocation channel proxy to identify 
REITs that appear to be judged by the market as efficient asset managers. In addition, we measure 
the change in property portfolio quality by the change in return on average assets. The Proceeds 
Utilization Hypothesis suggests that REITs can use the proceeds from property dispositions to 
reduce leverage, which may have a positive effect on the perceived credit quality. We use the 
change in outstanding debt as a percentage of total assets after dispositions to test this channel. 
Lastly, the Focus Hypothesis suggests that the geographic and property-type concentrations of a 
REIT’s property portfolio could be altered when property assets are sold or purchased. Conditional 
                                                        
3 According to S&P’s, a rating outlook assesses the potential direction of a long-term credit rating over the intermediate term 
(typically six months to two years). In determining a rating outlook, consideration is given to any changes in economic and/or 
fundamental business conditions. An outlook is not necessarily a precursor of a rating change. Positive means that a rating may 
be raised. Negative means that a rating may be lowered. 
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on the direction of change in focus, property transaction may have different effects on bond yield 
spreads and credit assessments. We calculate Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the 
geographic focus and property-type focus of a REIT’s property portfolio. We then examine how 
transaction activity differentially affects bond spreads and credit rating changes, conditional on 
different criteria. 
Our empirical results show that, in general, property transaction activity negatively affects 
creditors’ wealth. In the first part of tests, we find a significant and positive relation between 
property transaction activity and REIT bond yield spreads. However, this positive relation is 
largely mitigated when the firm’s stock is selling at a premium to its per share NAV, which is 
consistent with the Efficient Asset Allocation Hypothesis. We also find that an increase in 
geographic focus generally amplifies the effects of transaction activity on bond yield spreads. We 
find no support for the Proceeds Utilization hypothesis.  
In the second part of our analysis, we find that increased property transaction activity tends to 
increase the probability of a negative credit assessment. However, we find that the negative effect 
of property transaction is significantly mitigated when the REIT is trading at a premium to NAV, 
again supporting the Efficient Asset Allocation Hypothesis. We find some support for the Proceeds 
Utilization hypothesis suggesting that, conditional on using proceeds to pay down debt, property 
transaction activity is favorably or less negatively viewed by credit rating agencies. We also find 
that property transaction activity that is followed by an increase in geographic focus tends to 
decrease the probability of an upgrade, supporting the Focus hypothesis. 
This study contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to examine the wealth effect of property transaction activity from the 
perspective of creditors. We also propose three hypotheses to explore and explain the relation 
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between property transactions and creditor’s wealth. Second, the existing literature has primarily 
examined the short-term effect on the wealth of public bondholders after asset divestitures using 
cumulative bond excess returns surrounding announcements (Datta and Iskandar-Datta 1996; 
Datta et al. 2003). Using aggregate transaction activity as the independent variable, we are able to 
capture the economic effect of property transaction activity on firm credit risk, measured by both 
bond yield spreads and credit rating changes, over a longer time period. 
Third, this study extends the work of Brounen et al. (2007) by examining the relation between 
active trading and debt holder’s wealth. We are able to show that higher level of transaction activity 
tends to reduce creditors’ wealth; however, certain conditions tend to mitigate the negative effect 
of active trading activity. Lastly, this paper contributes to the literature related to diversification 
effect on cost of debt. Using the REIT market as a special laboratory, we capture the effects of 
portfolio geographic diversification on the cost of debt, in addition to the business/industry 
diversification effect studied in the corporate finance literature (e.g., Franco et al. 2015). The result 
from our study suggests that property geographic diversification (focus) decreases (increases) the 
cost of debt.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and 
discuss the motivation for REIT property transactions. We propose three possible mechanisms to 
explain how property trading affects debt holder’s wealth. Section 3 explains the regression models 
and the selection of variables. Section 4 describes the data and provides sample statistics. Section 
5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
Literature Review  
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Wealth Effects of Transaction Activities  
Most of the literature on asset transactions focuses on the effects on overall firm market value or 
shareholders’ wealth; only a few studies have examined the effects of asset transaction activity on 
debt holders’ wealth.  
For corporate asset transactions, the wealth gains of shareholders are derived from three 
primary sources: efficient redistribution of assets, use of proceeds, and increase in focus. Efficient 
asset redistribution occurs when the transaction is efficient; for example, when the buyer values 
the asset more than the seller does. When this occurs, some of the buyer’s value gains will be 
captured by the seller through a premium in the selling price. Studies on corporate asset sell-offs 
find that the abnormal returns range from 0.5% to 1.66% and are attributed primarily to efficient 
reallocation of assets to higher-valued uses (Alexander et al. 1984; Hite et al. 1987; Jain 1985). On 
the other hand, Lang et al. (1995) propose a financing hypothesis to explain value creation from 
asset sales. They find significant and positive abnormal returns for the payout subsample, but no 
significant effect for the sample of firms that retain sales proceeds. John and Ofek (1995) find that 
selling assets unrelated to the firm’s core business leads to an increase in focus and efficiency. 
Therefore, the positive announcement effect on stock returns is greater for focus-increasing 
divestitures. 
A substantial portion of the existing REIT literature studies the wealth implication of property 
trading activities from the perspective of shareholders. Most of these studies focus on either 
acquisitions or dispositions. McIntosh et al. (1995) find that REIT sellers who declare a one-time 
increase in dividends funded by the dispositions experience a share price increase. Campbell et al. 
(2003) observe positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of acquisitions. They 
provide evidence that the excess returns result from the increase in the geographic focus from the 
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acquisition. Campbell et al. (2006) find that abnormal returns from REIT sell-offs are inversely 
related to firms’ operating performance prior to the sale. This result is consistent with the asset 
efficiency explanation of shareholder returns. 
Brounen et al. (2007) study the effect of property acquisitions, dispositions, and trading 
intensity on REIT stock returns. They measure trading intensity by summing acquisitions and 
dispositions and posit that a high level of asset trading is a proxy for an active management strategy. 
They find that active trading does not generate outperformance. 
Among the few studies that have examined the effects of asset transaction activity on debt 
holders’ wealth, Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1996) and Datta et al. (2003) examine the wealth 
implications for bondholders and the net valuation effect on the ﬁrm as a whole. Using cumulative 
excess bond returns and cumulative stock returns after the divestiture transactions as proxy for 
bondholders’ and shareholders’ wealth, respectively, they find that divestitures are generally value 
enhancing to both stockholders and bondholders of the selling ﬁrm.   
As summarized above, the impact of property transactions on creditor’s wealth has been 
neglected in the previous research. This study fills the gap by investigating the trading activity of 
REITs from the perspective of debt holders. We examine the effects of acquisitions and 
dispositions, as well as the overall trading activity following Brounen et al. (2007).  
 
Reasons behind Property Transactions 
Prior studies suggest three primary reasons, or channels, to explain the relation between portfolio 
transaction activity and perceived credit risk. First, REITs generally attempt to improve asset 
quality through acquisitions and dispositions. As stated in the 2009 annual report of Apartment 
Investment and Management Company:  
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“We intend to upgrade the quality of our portfolio through the sale of approximately 5% to 
10% of our portfolio annually, with the proceeds generally used to increase our allocation of 
capital to well-located properties within our target markets through capital investments, 
redevelopment or acquisitions. We expect that increased geographic focus will also add to our 
investment knowledge and increase operating efficiencies based on local economies of scale.” 
 
In support of this view, Warusawitharana (2008) examines corporate asset transaction and reports 
evidence of relation between asset quality and transactions: more specifically, a decrease in the 
return on assets increases the likelihood of an asset sale.  
The second reported reason for REIT property transactions is the desire to utilize the proceeds 
from dispositions to reduce debt and/or to fund acquisitions. Studies on non-real estate asset sell-
offs by conventional firms tend to find that management’s decision to use sale proceeds to retire 
debt does not affect shareholder valuations. In fact, Lang et al. (1995) show that firms selling assets 
tend to be poor performers with high leverage. REIT disposition announcements often mention 
that one use of the proceeds will be to pay down debt and/or to make new acquisitions. For example, 
on October 27, 2005, the report of the Associated Estates Realty Corporation regarding the third 
quarter results indicated the following: 
“In August, the Company completed the sale of The Triangle Apartments, a 279-unit 
apartment community in Cleveland, OH, to nearby Case Western Reserve University 
(CWRU). The Company continues to manage the property for CWRU. The Company also 
completed the sale of Windsor at Metrowest, a 460-unit community in Orlando, on October 
24. Proceeds from the sales of properties are currently being used to pay down debt, repurchase 
shares of the Company's stock, and to acquire or develop properties.” 
 
Another reason for asset turnover is to increase the focus of the REIT by property type and/or 
geographic location. John and Ofek (1995) emphasize focus as an important motive for divestitures 
of corporate assets. Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Berger and Ofek 
(1995) all suggest that an increase in focus results in increased equity market value. Therefore, 
reducing the geographic dispersion of the firm’s asset base is an important motivation for a REIT 
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to reallocate its portfolio. This is reflected in the American Campus Communities Incorporated 
Third Quarter 2006 Earnings Conference Call on November 2, 2006:  
“On our last call, we announced that we were in the process of marketing The Village on 
University in Tempe, Arizona for sale. This strategic disposition gives us an opportunity to 
accretively recycle capital into the acquisition opportunities Bill previously discussed as well 
as to the pipeline development projects. This disposition also mitigated market exposure in 
Tempe as we bring newer, better-located product on line in the ASU market.” 
 
 
Based on the literature of asset transactions and the reasons for REITs to buy and sell 
properties, we suggest three possible hypotheses that explain the wealth implication of property 
transaction on creditors. 
The Efficient Asset Allocation Hypothesis has twofold implications. First, REITs perceived to 
have better management skills are able to reallocate their properties more efficiently. Ling et al. 
(2016) observe that high asset growth REITs tend to underperform low growth REITs, a typical 
finding in the general finance literature. However, they find that the growth effect is less negative, 
or nonexistent, for REITs selling at a premium to NAV. This result implies that, for firms that can 
fund asset growth in an efficient way (with cost of capital advantage), the negative effect of asset 
growth is alleviated. Second, REITs can alter the overall quality of their property portfolios through 
property trading activities. We interpret transactions which increase property quality as efficient 
asset allocation. Focusing on equity REIT property sell-offs, Campbell et al. (2006) find that 
abnormal shareholder returns are inversely related to a firm’s operating performance prior to the 
sell-off announcement. This finding is consistent with their hypothesis that the positive stock price 
response from asset sales results from asset reallocation efficiencies. We expect the efficient 
allocation of assets also adds to value to the positions of creditors. 
The Proceeds Utilization Hypothesis suggests REITs may use the proceeds from property 
dispositions to pay down debt or finance new investments. Therefore, dispositions may have a 
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positive effect on a firm’s financial profile because debt repayment reduces the leverage ratio and 
expands the potential for future profitable investment. However, this hypothesis may not hold for 
several reasons.  First, managers may undertake a risky investment to push up the stock price in 
the short run at the expense of debt holders’ wealth. In the long run, this risk-shifting opportunistic 
behavior will eventually increase the firm’s credit risk. Bond investors and credit rating agencies 
that measure default risk over long investment horizons may detect these value-decreasing 
investment decisions even when they temporarily boost stock prices. Thus, we have uncertain 
expectations about the impact of disposition proceeds on bond yields and credit ratings. 
The last mechanism we examine is characterized by the Focus Hypothesis. There are two 
types of focuses for real estate assets: property type and geographic location. Firms can increase 
the level of business focus by selling non-core properties and purchasing core properties. The 
geographic focus of a firm may also be changed through property transactions. Mansi and Reeb 
(2002) argue that diversification enhances bondholder value due to a reduction in firm risk. They 
suggest that shareholder equity is a call option on the value of the firm exercised in states where 
the value of the assets is greater than the value of the debt claim. Increasing the riskiness of the 
firm increases the value of the shareholders’ call option but decreases bondholder value.  
Using a sample of commercial bank loans, Demirci et al. (2018) do find that loan spreads tend 
to decline when REITs diversify across property types. They argue that equity holders are exposed 
to both the upside and downside of cash flow volatility, while bond holders are mostly concerned 
with downside risk. The risk arising from managerial specialization will not increase loan 
performance, but may increase default risk and widen loan spreads. We therefore expect a negative 
relation between trading activity and creditor’s wealth when property transactions result in higher 
levels of concentration.  
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Methodology  
 
 
Testing the Effects of Transaction Activity on Bond Yield Spreads 
 
 
To test the effects of transaction activity on bond yield spreads, we first regress observed spreads 
on several transaction proxies and a set of control variables: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽8𝐶𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
(1) 
 
Spreadit is the average daily difference between the (trade-size weighted) bond yield to maturity 
for the firm in year t and the yield on the benchmark U.S. Treasury with closest maturity in the 
same year. 4 We use three transaction activity proxies: Acq, Disp, and Trading. Acqi,t-1 is equal to 
the aggregate contractual gross sales price of properties bought during year t-1, divided by average 
value of total assets during year t-1, or  
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 =
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ) 2⁄
 
(2) 
Acqi,t-1 captures acquisition activity in year t-1 relative to the average value of the properties in the 
portfolio during year t-1.  Dispi,t-1 is equal to the aggregate contractual gross sales price of sold 
properties during year t-1, divided by average total asset value during the year, or 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 =
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1)/2
 
(3) 
 
Dispi,t-1 captures sales activity in year t-1 relative to the average value of the properties in the 
portfolio during year t-1.5 Finally, Trading is the sum of Acq and Disp, or 
                                                        
4 Our weighting approach is consistent with Bessembinder et al. (2008). 
5 A REIT is subject under Sec. 857(b)(6)(A) to a 100% tax on "net income derived from prohibited transactions," which generally 
includes net income from the sale or other disposition of property described in Sec. 1221(a)(1)—i.e., property primarily held by 
the REIT for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade of business (so-called dealer property)—and not pursuant to a 
foreclosure. Sec. 857(b)(6)(C) provides a safe harbor under which a prohibited transaction does not include the sale of a real estate 
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𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 =
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1)/2
 
(4) 
 
We posit that a high level of Trading is a proxy for an active trading strategy.  
Firm-level characteristics controlled for in the estimation of equation (1) include the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Firm Size), total debt as a percentage of total capitalization (Leverage), 
the number of years since the firm’s IPO (Age), the interest coverage ratio (Intcov), funds from 
operation divided by total assets (FFO),6 dividends per share (DPS), and the amount drawn on the 
firm’s credit line(s) as a percentage of total available credit lines (CLD). These firm-level controls 
are measured as of year (t-1) except Age. According to Standard & Poor’s (2004), these firm-level 
controls affect the credit risk of equity REITs. High levels of Intcov and FFO indicate relatively 
healthy firms that are likely to enjoy lower yield spreads. In contrast, high levels of Leverage and 
CLD are expected to be predictive of higher spreads. 
Following prior studies on bond yield spreads (Campbell and Taksler 2003; Chen et al. 2007), 
we also include a set of bond-level characteristics and macroeconomic variables as additional 
control variables in the estimation of equation (1). Bond characteristics include the credit rating 
issued by S&P (Rating), the bond’s coupon interest rate (Coupon), the natural logarithm of the 
bond offer amount (Issue Size), and the number of years to maturity (Maturity). Rating is a 
numerical value attached to each credit rating, where a higher value corresponds to lower credit 
quality issues. For example: 6=A; 12=BB. We use the average credit rating in year t-1 to predict 
bond yield spreads in year t. The coupon rate and issue size are time invariant.  
Macroeconomic variables included in the analysis are the yield on the closest benchmark 
                                                        
asset if certain requirements are met. 
6 FFO, as defined under the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) standards, consists of net earnings 
computed in accordance with GAAP, excluding gains (or losses) from sales of real estate assets and impairment, plus depreciation 
and amortization of real estate assets.  
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Treasury security (Treasury) and the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury yield 
(Termstr), which captures the slope of the term structure of interest rates. Prior studies (e.g. Collin-
Dufresne et al. 2001) interpret Termstr as an indication of expectations of future short rates, as well 
as an indication of the overall health of the economy. Termstr and Treasury are calculated as daily 
averages over year t. We are primarily interested in the estimated coefficient on our transaction 
proxies, β1.    
The estimation of equation (1) allows us to examine the direct effects of transaction activity 
on bond yields. However, as noted earlier, the literature suggests the effects of transaction activity 
may be conditional on a number of factors. For example, the effect of acquisitions and dispositions 
may be affected by whether the REIT’s stock is selling at a premium or discount to per share NAV. 
The effects of transaction activity on perceived credit risk may also be related to the recent 
operating performance of the firm, to the intended use of cash generated from dispositions, and to 
the extent to which acquisitions and dispositions are undertaken to alter the property type focus or 
geographic footprint of the firm.    
To examine the extent to which the effects of transaction activity are conditional on these 
different channels, we next estimate the following interactive model of bond yield spreads  
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 ∗
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽10𝐶𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽15𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽16𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
(5) 
 
Channel Dummy is a dichotomous variable that indicates a particular channel is in effect, such as 
a positive NAV premium. We discuss the selection of our channel dummy variables in detail in 
section 3.3. 
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Testing the Effects of Transaction Activity on Credit Rating Changes 
 
 
To examine how transaction activity affects credit ratings and outlook changes, we estimate the 
following probit regression model:  
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐶_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛾3𝐶_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐶_𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5𝐶_𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝐶_𝐶𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛾8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾9𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾11𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾12𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  
(6) 
 
The dependent variable, Rating Change, is one of four possible dichotomous variables, which are 
set to one if the bond was: upgraded sometime during year t (Upgrade); downgraded during the 
year t (Downgrade); assigned a positive credit rating outlook in year t by S&P (Positive); or 
assigned a negative credit rating outlook by S&P in year t (Negative). The rating agencies are often 
criticized for sluggishness in adjusting their ratings.7 As discussed above, a rating outlook may 
provide an early indication of the potential evolution of a firm’s credit rating over a period of 
between six months to two years. We use positive and negative rating outlooks to supplement 
credit rating changes to capture more timely credit risk information.  
Our selection of control variables is based on a survey of credit rating research pertaining to 
all firm types (e.g., Amato and Furfine 2004; Altman and Rijken 2004) as well as the REIT credit 
rating criteria suggested by Standard & Poor’s (2004). According to Standard & Poor’s, a corporate 
credit rating has two major components: financial risk and business position.8 To control for 
changes in financial risk, we employ the annual rate of change in the five firm-level variables 
discussed above (DPS, FFO, Intcov, Leverage, and CLD).  Firms that pay high dividends tend to 
have higher expectations of future cash flow and an ability to meet debt obligation. Therefore, we 
                                                        
7 See, for example, Löffler (2005) and Cheng and Neamtiu (2009). 
8 According to S&P’s rating criteria for U.S. REITs and real estate operating companies (REOCs), a REIT rating analysis has two 
major components. The first is business position assessment, which involves the assessment and benchmarking of the company 
along the following key dimensions: market position, asset quality, diversification and stability of operations, and operating strategy 
and management review. The second is financial risk profile, which refers to four elements: financial policy, profitability, cash flow 
protection, and capital structure and financial flexibility. 
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expect that dividend increases (C_DPS) will increase the probability of credit rating 
upgrades/positive outlooks. C_FFO, defined as the year-over-year change in funds from 
operations (FFO) divided by total assets captures variation in a REIT’s free cash flow. An increase 
in a firm’s interest coverage ratio (C_intcov) may also be predictive of a rating upgrade or positive 
outlook. C_Leverage is a direct measure of the year-over-year change in the use of debt in the 
firm’s capital structure. An increase in leverage should be associated with increased credit risk, on 
average. Finally, as a firm draws down its credit line, its ability to meet short-term debt obligations 
will be constrained. Thus, we expect an increased use of credit lines to be negatively related to 
credit rating upgrades and positive outlooks.  
For business position assessment, we control for total assets (Firm Size), firm age (Age), and 
systematic risk (Beta). Since larger firms generally face lower credit risk, Firm Size is expected to 
have a positive effect on credit assessments, all else equal. REITs with longer histories may have 
established a stronger position in the capital market than younger REITs and thus are expected to 
have lower credit risk, on average. We expect Beta to be negatively related to credit assessments. 
Finally, we include a peer total return index (Peer_index) to capture the recent market performance 
of similar REITs. The benchmark SNL return index chosen for each REIT is based upon the 
company's property type focus. We expect credit assessments to be positively related to recent 
returns in a REIT’s sector.   
We include two credit rating indicator variables: BBB- and BB+. BBB- is the lowest 
investment-grade credit rating, while BB+ is the highest speculative-grade rating. According to 
Brown and Riddiough (2003), REITs with unsecured public debt tend to have credit ratings that 
cluster just above the minimum investment-grade credit rating. We expect REITs with a minimum 
investment-grade rating (BBB-) to have less incentive to further pay down debt to achieve higher 
15 
 
ratings. Finally, we include REIT property type fixed effects and year fixed effects in all regression 
specifications.   
 
Channel Dummies 
 
 
As discussed in an earlier section, we propose three possible channels to explain the relation 
between portfolio transaction activity and perceived credit risk.  The Efficient Asset Allocation 
Hypothesis suggests that the effects of transaction activity on bond yields will partially depend on 
whether the management team is viewed by the market as being skilled at property transactions as 
well as on the quality of the properties included in the transactions. We use the firm’s stock price 
premium to per share net asset value (NAV) to capture the perceived quality of the management 
team and its ability to grow FFO and dividends.9 D_posNAV equals one if the REIT was selling at 
a premium to net asset value over the prior year; that is, if the average price to NAV ratio (share 
price divided by per share NAV) in year t-1 is greater than one. We measure the change in property 
portfolio quality by the change in return on average assets (ROAA). D_incROAA is set equal to 
one if the return on average assets increased over the prior year, and zero otherwise. 
To test the Proceeds Utilization Hypothesis, we examine the relation between leverage change 
and the impact of transaction activity on perceived credit quality. If a REIT uses the proceeds from 
property dispositions to pay down debt, the estimated effect of Disp and Trading on bond yields 
and credit risk may be less negative, or even positive. D_decLeverage is set equal to one if firm 
leverage decreased over the prior year, and zero otherwise. 
To test the Focus Hypothesis, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure 
changes in the geographic focus of a firm’s property portfolio in year t-1. This index is equal to 
                                                        
9 A detailed description of Green Street Advisors NAV pricing model can be found in https://www.greenstreetadvisors.com/ 
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the sum of squared proportion of property portfolio invested in each region, as suggested by John 
and Ofek (1995) and Capozza and Seguin (1999). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there are 
10 U.S. regions: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South 
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific, and Foreign. The geographic 
HHI for each REIT in each year is therefore calculated as 
HHIgeo=∑ 𝑆𝑖
210
1 , (7) 
where Si is the proportion of the property portfolio invested in region i.  
The weight we use to calculate the index at the end of year t-1 is the book value of each REIT’s 
assets invested in each of the 10 regions. If book values are not available, we use the total square 
footage of properties or the number of rooms/apartments as weights. If none of the above 
information can be found in a firm’s 10-k filings, we use the number of properties in each region 
as weights. Calculated values of HHI range from 0 to 1. Values approaching one indicate a high 
level of geographic focus. The channel dummy (D_incHHIgeo) is set to one if the change in 
HHIgeo is positive over the year t-1.  
Similarly, we construct a property-type HHI in each year for each REIT as: 
HHItype=∑ 𝑃𝑖
210
1 ,                                                             (8) 
where Pi is the proportion of the property portfolio invested in property type i. SNL classifies 
REITs into 10 property type categories: Multifamily, Industrial, Office, Hotel, Retail, Healthcare, 
Self-Storage, Manufactured Homes, Restaurant, and Other. We weight by the number of properties 
in each category. The channel dummy (D_incHHItype) is set to one if the year-over-year change 
in HHItype is positive.  
To examine the extent to which the impact of transaction activity on credit rating changes and 
outlooks depends on our conditioning variables, we interact our property transaction variables with 
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three channel dummies to examine how transaction activity differentially affects bond spreads and 
credit rating changes, conditional on different criteria. These interaction variables, as well as the 
channel dummies, are included along with our other control variables in an augmented 
specification of equation (6).    
 
Data and Summary Statistics  
 
 
We construct our sample from all the listed equity REITs in the U.S. Credit rating changes and 
ratings outlook data come from the SNL Financial database. This database provides the end-of-
year credit ratings assigned by three rating agencies: S&P, Moody, and Fitch. We use the long-term 
S&P credit ratings in this research because few REITs consistently have ratings from the other two 
agencies. Property transactions and firm-level accounting data are also from SNL. We construct 
bond yield spreads using bond yield data from Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). 
TRACE provides daily transaction data on bond yields starting in July 2002. U.S. Treasury yields 
are obtained from the FED website. We obtain bond-level information from Mergent Fixed Income 
Securities Database (FISD). Mergent FISD provides cross sectional descriptive data on corporate 
bonds, including maturity, coupon, amount offered, etc. Property-level location data used to 
calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are hand-collected from the 10-k filing forms. 
Information on the property type focus of each REIT at the beginning of each year is collected 
from SNL. Time-varying firm-level NAV premiums were provided by Green Street Advisors, LLC. 
Our sample size is restricted by the availability of both credit ratings and yield spread data. To 
be included in our sample, a REIT must have a credit rating assigned by S&P for at least three 
consecutive years. We also exclude REITs with missing property transactions data or required 
accounting data. After merging cross-sectional data from Mergent FISD and yield spread data from 
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TRACE, we eliminate REITs without available bond information from either of these two 
databases. Through this search process, we identify 35 REITs with the necessary data from 2003 
to 2012. These 35 firms are used to construct two independent samples for our bond yield and 
credit rating/outlook analyses. We have 184 firm-year observations in our bond yield sample and 
266 observations in our credit rating/outlook sample.  
Table 1 displays three sets of summary statistics. The first (panel A) contains the mean, median, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviation for variables used in both our bond yield and credit 
rating analyses. Panel B contains the corresponding summary statistics for variables used only in 
our bond yield analysis, while panel C displays information on variables used in our analysis of 
credit rating changes.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
During our sample period, the mean value of Acq (weighted by the book value of total assets) 
is 11.4 percent. The corresponding average for Disp is 4.9 percent, indicating that REITs were 
more active buyers than sellers during our sample period. The mean rate of trading intensity is 16.3 
percent, but the standard deviation of 15.9 percent indicates significant variation across REITs and 
over time during our sample period. In our sample, REITs were trading at a premium to NAV in 
65.5 percent of the firm-year observations. Slightly less than half of the REITs in our sample 
experienced an average year-over-year increase in return on average assets. REITs were 
approximately equally likely to increase or decrease leverage or their geographic concentration 
from year to year. The mean age of REITs in our sample is approximately 16 years. 
The mean (median) bond yield spread is 3.13 (2.25) percentage points (Panel B). Mean 
leverage is 39 percent but ranges from 17.5 percent to 81.8 percent. The mean value of FFO divided 
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by total assets is 5.3 percent. Dividends per share have a sample average of $1.97. The mean 
percentage of available credit lines drawn upon by REITs is 26.8 percent; however, this percentage 
varies significantly across REITs and time. The credit rating of REITs averaged 9.1, which 
corresponds to a rating between BBB- and BBB. This is consistent with Brown and Riddiough 
(2003)’s observation that REITs tend to target a minimum investment-grade credit rating. The 
average coupon rate on unsecured debt is 6.23 percent and the average remaining term to maturity 
is almost nine years. The Treasury yield term structure has an average slope of 1.56 percentage 
points and the mean yield on the closest benchmark Treasury security is 3.23 percent.     
As previously discussed, credit ratings on bonds tend to be altered infrequently. In our sample, 
bond upgrades occurred in 6.5 percent of the firm-years in our sample, which is very similar to the 
occurrence of a downgrade. Positive or negative outlooks occurred slightly more frequently than 
actual upgrades or downgrades. The typical REIT increased its leverage (including the amount 
drawn on credit lines) and decreased its interest coverage ratio modestly over the sample period. 
However, the average change in FFO and dividends per share were also positive. The average Beta 
is 0.932 with a standard deviation of 0.202. In 25.4 percent of our observations, the REIT carried 
a credit rating of BBB-; in 7.5 percent of the observations, the observed credit rating was BB+.    
In Table 2, we summarize the mean value of select variables by credit rating. We group firms 
into rating categories from A to B- as assigned by the rating agency. Most of the firm-year 
observations are concentrated around a rating of BBB (from BBB+ to BBB-). REITs with 
investment-grade ratings (BBB- and above) tend to engage in more acquisitions than firms with 
speculative-grade ratings (BB+ and below). However, we observe little difference between the two 
groups of REITs in disposition activity. In our sample, investment-grade REITs are typically 
associated with a premium to NAV, while speculative-grade REITs are mostly traded at a discount 
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to NAV. More highly rated REITs tend to generate a higher ROAA and use less leverage, with a 
few exceptions. No clear relation between rating and our focus variables (HHIgeo and HHItype) 
is observed.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Empirical Results  
 
 
Bond Spread Results 
 
 
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results from the estimation of equation (1). Coefficients are 
reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Error terms are clustered by firm and robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. We first test the effects of property transaction 
activity on REIT bond yield spreads without channel dummy interactions. The first two columns 
show the results of these baseline bond yield regressions controlling for firm characteristics. We 
then add bond-level control variables as well as the level of Treasury yields and the slope of term 
structure. These augmented regression results are reported in column 3 and column 4.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
We estimate positive and significant coefficients on both Disp and Trading without bond level 
controls. More specifically, if dispositions increase by one percentage point, the corporate bond 
spread rises by 0.12 percentage points. If overall trading activity rises by one percentage point, the 
bond spread rises by 0.02 percentage point. The estimated coefficient on Acq is not statistically 
significant. Adding bond specific controls to the regression reduces the magnitude and significance 
of the transaction activity proxies.   
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The estimated coefficients on Leverage and CLD are generally positive and weakly significant, 
suggesting that higher debt ratios and increased use of credit lines increases credit risk. In column 
1 and column 3, we report a negative and significant association between firm age and yield spread, 
suggesting older firms are perceived to be less risky. The estimated coefficient on Intcov is 
consistently positive and significant, which is not consistent with expectations. The estimated 
coefficients on other firm-level control variables (Firm Size and DPS) are not statistically 
significant.  
With respect to our set of bond control variables, the estimated coefficients on bond rating, 
coupon rate, issue size, and Treasury rate are not significantly different from zero. However, we 
find a significant negative relationship between remaining maturity and yield spreads. This 
contradicts the result in Campbell and Taksler (2003) who find that longer maturities are often 
associated with higher yield spreads. Chen et al. (2007), on the other hand, find a negative relation 
between remaining maturity and yield spreads for their speculative-grade bond sample. In our 
sample, most of the REITs are at the boundary between investment-grade and speculative-grade. 
Helwege and Turner (1999) argue that higher quality firms are able to issue bonds with longer 
maturities, which results in a negative relation between yield spread and maturity.  
The estimated coefficient of the term structure slope is significantly positive, which also 
contradicts the findings in Campbell and Taksler (2003). However, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) 
also find significant positive coefficients on the slope of the term structure in their short-maturity 
(less than nine years) subsamples. In our sample, the median maturity is 8 years. We therefore 
suspect short-maturity bonds could be driving this result.  
The results reported in Table 3 provide some evidence that property transaction activity, 
particularly property dispositions, are associated with higher bond spreads without conditioning 
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on NAV premiums, changes in ROAA, the use of disposition proceeds, or changes in geographic 
and property-type focus. We next present regression results that include these interaction effects. 
Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions testing the Efficient Asset Allocation hypothesis. We 
employ two dummies variables to construct interaction terms with our property transaction proxies. 
The first is a positive premium to NAV (D_posNAV) and the second is an increase in ROAA 
(D_incROAA) over the prior year. Column 1 and 2 display the results using the NAV dummy 
variable and columns 3 and 4 present the results using D_incROAA as our interaction variable. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Consistent with the results reported in Table 3, the estimated coefficients on Disp and Trading 
are positive and significant when conditioning on the NAV premium. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient on Acq is also positive and highly significant, suggesting that perceived credit risk is 
increased by heightened acquisition activity when a NAV premium dummy is included. More 
importantly, the estimated coefficients on the three NAV premium interaction variables are 
negative and statistically significant. For example, in model [1], the estimated coefficient on 
Acq*D_posNAV is -5.431 and is significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient on Trading 
(column [2]) is also positive and significant at the 5 percent level. However, the estimated 
coefficient on the NAV interaction variable, Trading*D_posNAV is negative and significant and 
larger in magnitude than the coefficient on Trading. Similarly, dispositions undertaken by REITs 
selling at a discount to NAV are associated with higher yield spreads; however, this negative 
trading effect is eliminated if the firm is selling at a premium to NAV. The estimated impact of the 
control variables are largely unaltered by the inclusion of the channel dummies and interactions 
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and are therefore not tabulated to conserve space.   
Taken together, these results imply that transaction activity tends to be negatively perceived 
by creditors when NAV premiums are negative. However, this effect is mitigated if the REIT is 
trading at a premium to NAV. This result is consistent with our Efficient Asset Allocation 
hypothesis: REITs that are perceived by the market to have the ability to grow rental income and 
increase asset values are not penalized by bond investors for active trading of portfolio assets.  
We next examine how increases in operating performance (ROAA) over the prior year interact 
with trading activity in the determination of bond yield spreads. These results reported in columns 
[3] and [4] of Table 4. When trading activity is conditioned on prior year changes in ROAA, the 
estimated coefficients on Acq, Disp and Trading are no longer significant and the interaction 
variables produce no significant explanatory power.  
We next estimate equation (6) conditioning on the use of proceeds from dispositions and 
changes in geographic and property type focus. These results are reported in Table 5. The results 
for our large set of control variables are again suppressed to conserve space. In the results reported 
in models [1] and [2], we use D_decLeverage as the channel dummy. We expect the positive 
relation between bond spreads and transaction activity to be mitigated when REITs use the 
proceeds from property transactions to pay down debt. However, the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term Disp*D_decLeverage is insignificant, which provides no support for the Proceeds 
Utilization hypothesis. The estimated coefficients on the remaining interaction terms are not 
significantly different from zero. 
In column 3 and 4 of Table 5, we present results from estimating our yield spread regressions 
while controlling for changes in the firm’s geographic focus over the prior year. The estimated 
coefficients on Acq*(D_incHHIgeo) and Trading *(D_incHHIgeo) are positive and significant. No 
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significant results are found for the property disposition and focus interactions. These results 
suggest that acquisitions that increase a REIT’s geographic focus are perceived by bondholders as 
risk increasing. This finding is consistent with the results reported by Mansi and Reeb (2002), who 
suggest that, although diversification reduces shareholder value, it enhances the position of 
bondholders by reducing firm risk. Therefore, increased concentration increases stockholders’ 
wealth, but increase creditors’ risk exposure. Although not separately tabulated, we find that the 
effects of transaction activity on bond yields are not related to changes in property type focus 
(D_incHHItype). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
To summarize the results of our bond yield analysis, we find that property transaction activity 
is positively and significantly related to REIT bond spreads. This positive relation is largely 
mitigated when the firm’s stock is selling at a premium to its NAV, which is consistent with the 
Efficient Asset Allocation hypothesis. We find no support for the Proceeds Utilization hypothesis. 
We also find that an increase in geographic focus generally amplifies the effects of transaction 
activity on yield spreads. In the following section, we discuss the results obtained using credit 
rating changes and changes in outlooks as the dependent variable.        
                   
Credit Rating Change Results 
 
 
Table 6 presents our probit regression results. We employ four different dichotomous dependent 
variables: upgrade, downgrade, positive outlook, negative outlook. We include both year fixed 
effects and property-type fixed effects in all specifications. The results reported in columns (1) 
through (4) suggest trading activity is not predictive of ratings upgrades or downgrades.  
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In column 5, we find a marginally significant negative relation between property dispositions 
and the probability of a positive credit rating outlook in the next year. Moreover, we find that the 
estimated coefficient on all of three transaction proxies are positive and significant in our negative 
outlook regressions (columns 7 and 8), suggesting that increased transaction activity tends to 
increase the probability of a negative rating outlook.  
The control variable coefficient estimates have the expected signs except the coefficients on 
C_CLD, Size and Age. We find that an increase in leverage lowers the probability of an upgrade 
and increases the probability of a negative credit assessment. An increase in the dividend yield is 
positively related to the probability of a favourable credit assessment. Larger firm is less likely to 
receive positive outlooks. Older firm has smaller chance to be upgraded in our sample. We find 
credit assessments are positively related to recent returns in REIT’s industry. REITs with higher 
beta are more likely to be downgraded compared with other REITs.  
Table 7 displays the results from estimating our probit regressions while conditioning on the 
firm’s average NAV premium of the prior year. The regressions specifications are otherwise 
identical to those reported in Table 6, although we suppress the results for the control variables. 
The estimated coefficients on the transaction proxies (Acq, Disp, and Trading) are negative and 
highly significant when dependent variable is Upgrade (column 1 and 2), indicating that 
transaction activity is negatively related to the probability of a ratings upgrade. However, 
consistent with the bond spread results reported in Table 4, we find the estimated coefficients on 
the interaction terms are significantly positive when dependent variable is Upgrade. This is 
consistent with the credit rating agencies removing the “stop sign” when trading activity is 
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occurring when NAV premiums are positive. Interestingly, trading activity appears to be unrelated 
to the probability of a downgrade or positive outlook. However, the results reported in column 7 
and 8 suggest that Disp and Trading are predictive of a negative outlook in the following year. 
These results suggest that transaction activity increases the probability of receiving a negative 
credit assessment. However, this unfavorable result is mitigated when the REIT is trading at a 
premium to NAV. These results are consistent with the Efficient Asset Allocation hypothesis. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
We next replace the NAV premium dummy variable with our increase in ROAA dummy and 
re-estimate the same set of regressions. We present the results in Table 8, again suppressing the 
control variable estimates. The estimated coefficients on Acq and Trading are negative and weakly 
significant in our upgrade regressions. However, the negative effect of trading is not significantly 
reduced when the REIT experiences an increase in ROAA after property transactions. Overall, 
conditioning on lagged ROAA has little effect on the remaining results reported in Table 8.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 9 reports the results of our probit regressions that test the Proceeds Utilization 
hypothesis. As shown in column 1, column 2 and column 5, the interaction term on our transaction 
proxy and the decrease in leverage is positively related to the probability of an upgrade and positive 
rating outlook in the next year. The estimated coefficient on Disp*D_decLeverage is highly 
significant and negative, with downgrade as the dependent variable (column 3). The estimated 
coefficients on transaction variables are not statistically significant. This result implies that when 
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a firm’s debt ratio decreases after selling off properties, property dispositions are likely to reduce 
the possibility of being downgraded in the next year. Overall we find some support for the Proceeds 
Utilization hypothesis; that is, conditional on using proceeds to pay down debt, property 
transaction activity is favorably or less negatively viewed by credit rating agencies. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
Finally, we explore the Focus mechanism on credit rating change in Table 10. Consistent with 
the results in Table 5, we find the interaction of property disposition and an increase in geographic 
focus is negatively related to the possibility of upgrade at 5% significance level, and is positively 
related to the possibility of downgrade at 10% level. When the dependent variable is rating outlook 
dummy, the estimated coefficient on interaction term is not observed to be significant. The 
estimated coefficients on Acq and Trading reported in columns (5) and (7) reinforce our finding 
that increased transaction activity is viewed negatively by credit rating agencies. Overall, these 
results are weakly supportive of the Focus hypothesis on bondholder wealth effects; that is, more 
concentration indicates higher risk and lower credit assessments.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
 
Capital recycling through periodic rebalancing of the asset portfolio is of paramount importance 
for non-finite lived vehicles such as REITs. Most of the previous research examines how real estate 
acquisitions and dispositions affect the value of shareholders. However, the impact of transaction 
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activity on debt holders’ wealth has been neglected. In this paper, we try to fill this gap in the 
literature by investigating the relation between property transactions and creditor’s value. We 
employ bond yield spreads and credit ratings as the proxies for the value of the economic interests 
of bondholders and other debt holders. We examine the effect of acquisitions, dispositions, as well 
as overall trading intensity on bond spreads and the probability of a rating change or a positive or 
negative rating outlook. Our empirical results show that property transaction activity tends to 
decrease the wealth of creditors. 
We further investigate the underlying economic channels that explain the relation between 
property transaction activity and bondholder’s wealth. Motivated by corporate asset transaction 
literature and press releases on REIT property transactions, we propose three potential mechanisms 
through which trading activity affects REIT bond yield spreads and credit assessments: Efficient 
Asset Allocation, Proceeds Utilization, and Focus. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that 
the negative effect of property transactions tend to be mitigated when REITs are trading at a 
premium to NAV, and when they reduce leverage following transactions. The negative effect of 
transaction activity is strengthened when transactions result in an increase in geographic focus. 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Common Variables in Both Tests 
  Mean Min P50 Max Sd 
Acq 0.114 0 0.073 0.871 0.14 
Disp 0.049 0 0.027 0.499 0.064 
Trading 0.163 0 0.116 0.94 0.159 
D_posNAV 0.655 0 1 1 0.477 
D_incROAA 0.469 0 0 1 0.5 
D_decLeverage 0.505 0 1 1 0.501 
D_incHHIgeo 0.517 0 1 1 0.501 
D_incHHItype 0.311 0 0 1 0.464 
Firm Size 15.483 13.828 15.357 17.122 0.745 
Age 15.905 0 14 42 7.197 
Panel B: Variables only in Spread Tests  
  Mean Min P50 Max Sd 
Spread(%) 3.128 -4.325 2.249 29.108 3.516 
Leverage(%) 39.293 17.506 37.89 81.819 10.532 
Intcov 2.982 0.658 2.922 6.069 0.814 
FFO 0.053 -0.012 0.053 0.099 0.016 
DPS 1.965 0 1.76 8.7 1.14 
CLD(%) 26.729 0 23.303 91.049 23.474 
Rating 9.154 6 9 14 1.387 
Coupon(×10) 0.623 0.362 0.615 0.9 0.12 
Issue size 12.118 10.127 12.206 13.319 0.648 
Maturity 8.953 2 8 24 4.568 
Termstr 1.557 0.031 1.984 2.669 0.997 
Treasury 3.234 0.272 3.501 5.157 1.478 
Panel C: Variables only in Rating Change Tests  
  Mean Min P50 Max Sd 
Upgrade 0.065 0 0 1 0.246 
Downgrade 0.063 0 0 1 0.242 
Positive 0.078 0 0 1 0.268 
Negative 0.08 0 0 1 0.271 
C_leverage 0.025 -0.96 -0.028 3.176 0.287 
C_intcov -0.017 -9.58 -0.011 2.516 0.579 
C_FFO 0.225 -8.082 -0.007 78.199 4.149 
C_DPS 0.093 -1 0.011 4.8 0.592 
C_CLD 0.262 -1 -0.016 14 1.816 
Peer_index 210.505 17.253 184.317 947.101 146.795 
Beta 0.932 0.579 0.895 1.741 0.202 
BBB- 0.254 0 0 1 0.436 
BB+ 0.075 0 0 1 0.264 
33 
 
 
Note:  Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample of 35 REITs used in this study during 2003 to 
2012. There are 184 firm-year observations in the bond test and 266 firm-year observations in the credit 
assessment test. We report sample mean (Mean), minimum value (Min), median value (P50), maximum 
value (Max), and standard deviation (Sd).   
Panel A presents the summary statistics for the variables used in both bond and credit rating/outlook 
tests. Acq is equal to the aggregate contractual gross sales price of properties bought during year t-1, divided 
by average value of total assets during year t-1. Disp is equal to the aggregate contractual gross sales price 
of sold properties during year t-1, divided by average total asset value during the year. Trading is the sum 
of Acq and Disp. D_posNAV equals one if the REIT was selling at a premium to net asset value over the 
period of property transaction activity; that is, if the average price to NAV ratio (share price divided by per 
share NAV) in year t-1 is greater than one. D_incROAA is set equal to one if the return on average assets 
increased over the prior year, and zero otherwise. D_decLeverage is set equal to one if firm leverage 
decreased over the prior year, and zero otherwise. D_incHHIgeo is set to one if the change in geographic 
concentration level (measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index) is positive over the year t-1, and zero 
otherwise. D_incHHItype is set to one if the year-over-year change in property-type concentration level is 
positive, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the number of years 
since the firm’s IPO.  
Panel B presents the summary statistics for the variables used only in bond yield spread test. Spread 
is the average daily difference between the yield to maturity on the bond in the year t and the yield on the 
benchmark U.S. Treasury with the closest maturity in the same year. Intcov is interest coverage ratio, 
calculated by dividing earnings before interest and taxes by interest expenses for the same period. FFO is 
funds from operation divided by total assets. DPS is dividends per share. CLD is the percentage amount 
drawn on the firm’s credit line(s) divided by the total available credit line. Rating is the credit rating issued 
by S&P, Coupon is the bond’s coupon interest rate multiplied by 10, Issue Size is the natural logarithm of 
the bond offer amount, and Maturity is the number of years to maturity of the bond. Treasury is the closest 
benchmark Treasury rate. Termstr is the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury rates.   
Panel C describes the summary statistics for the variables used only in credit rating change/outlook 
test. Upgrade is set to one if firm is upgraded sometime during the year t, and zero otherwise. Downgrade 
is set to one if firm is downgraded during the year t, and zero otherwise. Positive/Negative equals one if 
firm is assigned a positive/negative credit rating outlook in year t by S&P, and zero otherwise.  C_Leverage, 
C_ Intcov, C_FFO, C_DPS, and C_CLD are the year-over-year change in leverage, interest coverage, funds 
from operations divided by total assets, dividend per share, and credit line drawn as percentage of total 
available credit line, respectively. Peer_index is a peer total return index that captures the recent market 
performance of similar REITs. Beta is a measure of systematic risk calculated by the past one-year’s stock 
return. BBB- and BB+ are both dummy variables, which are set to one if the credit rating is BBB- and BB+, 
respectively. 
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Table 2  Sample Summary by Credit Rating 
Rating  N Acq Disp Trading NAVprem ROAA Leverage(%) HHIgeo HHItype 
A 2 0.122 0.033 0.154 0.186 5.213 36.563 0.328 0.710 
A- 16 0.132 0.058 0.189 0.083 5.500 29.330 0.210 0.951 
BBB+ 43 0.061 0.039 0.099 0.064 3.735 36.570 0.284 0.836 
BBB 95 0.114 0.065 0.179 0.042 3.377 39.111 0.336 0.869 
BBB- 64 0.095 0.047 0.142 0.026 2.646 41.284 0.367 0.920 
BB+ 17 0.129 0.058 0.188 -0.037 3.233 44.044 0.287 0.955 
BB 12 0.057 0.053 0.111 -0.101 1.297 48.732 0.216 0.993 
BB- 6 0.031 0.056 0.087 -0.193 0.692 54.877 0.178 0.948 
B+ 8 0.046 0.037 0.083 -0.237 -0.005 63.943 0.374 0.933 
B 2 0.035 0.147 0.182 -0.335 4.504 67.453 0.611 1.000 
B- 1 0.042 0.037 0.079 2.376 -8.856 56.695 0.179 1.000 
          
Total 266 0.096 0.054 0.15 0.028 3.098 40.747 0.319 0.895 
 
Note: Table 2 summarizes the number of observations and the average value of select variables by credit ratings. NAVprem is the value of NAV 
premium, calculated by stock price divided by NAV per share minus one. ROAA is the return on average assets, calculated by net income divided 
by total assets. HHIgeo is the sum of squared proportion of property portfolio invested in each region. HHItype is the sum of squared proportion of 
property portfolio invested in each property type.
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Table 3  Property Transactions and Bond Yield Spreads: Overall 
Dependent variable Spread 
Model# [1] [2] [3] [4] 
          
Acq 0.791 
 
-0.017 
 
 
(0.89) 
 
(-0.02) 
 
Disp 11.607** 
 
8.896* 
 
 
(2.11) 
 
(1.69) 
 
Trading 
 
2.123*** 
 
1.026 
 
 
(2.85) 
 
(1.56) 
Firm Size 0.089 0.139 0.449 0.387 
 
(0.24) (0.32) (0.88) (0.77) 
Leverage 0.080* 0.079* 0.055 0.056*  
(1.98) (1.98) (1.69) (1.72) 
Age -0.044** -0.032 -0.029* -0.019 
 
(-2.47) (-1.66) (-1.84) (-0.95) 
Intcov 0.895** 0.884** 0.901** 0.921** 
 
(2.22) (2.38) (2.45) (2.63) 
FFO 37.222 38.125 31.155 27.180  
(1.24) (1.26) (0.95) (0.85) 
DPS -0.297 -0.326 0.041 0.025  
(-1.55) (-1.68) (0.18) (0.12) 
CLD 0.009 0.010* 0.011* 0.012* 
 
(1.66) (1.83) (1.75) (1.92) 
Rating 
  
0.387 0.284 
 
  
(1.26) (1.10) 
Coupon 
  
2.369 2.929 
 
  
(1.29) (1.68) 
Issue size 
  
-0.681 -0.694 
 
  
(-1.62) (-1.59) 
Maturity 
  
-0.280*** -0.312*** 
 
  
(-3.37) (-3.52) 
Termstr 
  
1.109*** 1.172*** 
 
  
(3.61) (3.55) 
Treasury 
  
0.663 0.733 
 
  
(1.27) (1.39) 
Constant -5.023 -5.538 -7.821 -5.959 
 
(-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.84) (-0.63) 
     
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Ptype FE Y Y Y Y 
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Observations 184 184 184 184 
R-squared 0.706 0.691 0.739 0.730 
 
Note: Table 3 presents the OLS estimation result of equation (1). The dependent variable is Spread. Each 
estimation includes year fixed effects and property-type fixed effects. Based on the corresponding t-statistic 
in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance for the estimated coefficient at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. Error terms are clustered by firm and robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation.
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Table 4  Property Transactions and Bond Yield Spread: Testing Efficient Asset Allocation 
Testing Channel: Efficient Asset Allocation 
Channel Dummy Variables: Positive Premium to NAV Increase in ROAA 
Model# [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
Acq 3.855***  0.337  
 (3.39)  (0.39)  
Acq*Channel Dummy -5.431***  -0.635  
 (-3.70)  (-0.42)  
Disp 18.328*  12.892  
 (1.74)  (1.49)  
Disp*Channel Dummy -20.197*  -14.568  
 (-1.79)  (-1.40)  
Trading  6.711**  2.131 
  (2.24)  (1.46) 
Trading*Channel Dummy  -8.424**  -3.093 
  (-2.35)  (-1.06) 
Channel Dummy 2.003** 1.522** 0.920 0.524 
 (2.06) (2.10) (1.22) (0.90) 
Constant -11.682 -8.343 -11.344 -7.447 
 (-0.91) (-0.71) (-1.22) (-0.77) 
     
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Ptype FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 149 149 184 184 
R-squared 0.765 0.751 0.752 0.734 
 
Note: Table 4 reports the OLS estimation result of equation (5). We test the Efficient Asset Allocation 
hypothesis using D_posNAV and D_incROAA as the channel dummy variables. The dependent variable is 
Spread. Each estimation includes year fixed effects and property-type fixed effects. Based on the 
corresponding t-statistic in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance for the estimated 
coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. Error terms are clustered by firm and 
robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. Control variables (same as in Table 3) are not 
shown in the table but are included in every estimation. 
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Table 5  Property Transactions and Bond Yield Spread: Testing Proceeds Utilization & Focus 
Testing Channel: Proceeds Utilization Focus 
Channel Dummy Variables: Decrease in leverage Increase in geographical focus 
Model# [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
Acqt-1 0.837  -1.542  
 (0.68)  (-1.24)  
Acq*Channel Dummy -1.715  4.249**  
 (-0.91)  (2.60)  
Dispt-1 13.431  3.171  
 (1.49)  (1.03)  
Disp*Channel Dummy -13.982  1.922  
 (-1.45)  (0.41)  
Tradingt-1  2.409  -0.800 
  (1.44)  (-0.73) 
Trading*Channel Dummy  -3.635  3.632** 
  (-1.32)  (2.46) 
Channel Dummy 0.713 0.345 -1.166** -1.202** 
 (0.90) (0.49) (-2.64) (-2.51) 
Constant -6.587 -6.069 -0.534 1.991 
 (-0.87) (-0.70) (-0.05) (0.19) 
     
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Ptype FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 184 184 131 131 
R-squared 0.752 0.736 0.777 0.775 
 
Note: Table 5 reports the OLS estimation result of equation (5). We test the Proceeds Utilization and Focus 
hypothesis using D_decLeverage and D_incHHIgeo as the channel dummy variables. The dependent 
variable is Spread. Each estimation includes year fixed effects and property-type fixed effects. Based on 
the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance for the estimated 
coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. Error terms are clustered by firm and 
robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. Control variables (same as in Table 3) are not 
shown in the table but are included in every estimation. 
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Table 6  Property Transactions and Credit Rating Changes: Overall 
Dependent variable: Upgrade Upgrade Downgrade Downgrade Positive  Positive  Negative Negative 
Model# (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Acq -1.554  1.191  0.981  1.668**  
 (-1.46)  (1.29)  (1.13)  (2.21)  
Disp -0.179  -1.639  -7.821*  5.102***  
 (-0.06)  (-0.73)  (-1.83)  (3.07)  
Trading  -1.335  0.674  0.155  2.363*** 
  (-1.35)  (0.88)  (0.15)  (3.60) 
C_leverage -1.738** -1.748*** 1.402* 1.494* -0.751 -0.581 1.665** 1.481* 
 (-2.54) (-2.58) (1.67) (1.76) (-1.18) (-0.94) (2.04) (1.86) 
C_intcov 0.223 0.222 -0.303 -0.293 0.039 0.042 0.713 0.746 
 (1.52) (1.45) (-1.33) (-1.22) (0.26) (0.26) (1.07) (1.47) 
C_FFO 0.098 0.089 -0.174** -0.157* 0.202 0.190 0.193 0.133 
 (0.80) (0.82) (-2.19) (-1.94) (1.26) (1.31) (1.09) (0.84) 
C_DPS 0.694* 0.714* -1.631*** -1.650*** 1.415*** 1.171*** -0.254 -0.167 
 (1.75) (1.79) (-3.32) (-3.19) (3.44) (2.85) (-0.85) (-0.55) 
C_CLD 0.125* 0.122* 0.093 0.094 0.053 0.067 -0.220** -0.237** 
 (1.84) (1.79) (1.45) (1.46) (1.01) (1.43) (-2.26) (-2.27) 
Firm Size -0.114 -0.108 -0.231 -0.235 -0.350** -0.295* 0.110 0.115 
 (-0.46) (-0.44) (-1.56) (-1.63) (-2.16) (-1.75) (0.64) (0.69) 
Age -0.059** -0.057** 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.012 
 (-2.30) (-2.33) (0.10) (0.00) (0.34) (0.23) (0.57) (0.63) 
Peer_index 0.004** 0.003** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002* -0.006** -0.006** 
 (1.98) (1.98) (0.73) (0.83) (1.30) (1.65) (-2.33) (-2.38) 
Beta 0.204 0.235 3.917*** 3.644*** -1.112 -1.431 1.351 1.597 
 (0.20) (0.24) (4.43) (4.27) (-1.17) (-1.46) (1.26) (1.45) 
BBB- -0.702 -0.673 -0.993* -1.044** -0.044 -0.140 0.253 0.361 
 (-1.19) (-1.20) (-1.87) (-2.03) (-0.15) (-0.51) (0.72) (1.04) 
BB+ 0.139 0.120 0.269 0.267 -0.691 -0.320 -0.189 -0.046 
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 (0.33) (0.28) (0.53) (0.54) (-1.22) (-0.60) (-0.35) (-0.08) 
Constant -0.017 -0.181 -3.946 -3.360 4.447* 3.926 -4.837 -5.278 
 (-0.00) (-0.05) (-1.37) (-1.16) (1.73) (1.50) (-1.47) (-1.58) 
         
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ptype FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 
Pseudo R-squared 0.210 0.209 0.354 0.348 0.219 0.177 0.412 0.404 
 
Note: Table 6 reports the probit regression result of equation (6). We employ four different dichotomous dependent variables: upgrade, downgrade, 
positive outlook, negative outlook. Each estimation includes year fixed effects and property-type fixed effects. Based on the corresponding t-statistic 
in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance for the estimated coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. 
Error terms are clustered by firm and robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation.
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Table 7  Property Transaction and Credit Rating Change: Testing Efficient Asset Allocation (NAV premium) 
Dependent variable: Upgrade Upgrade Downgrade Downgrade Positive Positive Negative Negative 
Model# (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Acq -16.859***  1.221  1.975*  1.162  
 (-2.59)  (1.25)  (1.81)  (0.76)  
Acq*D_posNAV 10.919*  -0.863  0.193  -3.754**  
 (1.66)  (-0.58)  (0.14)  (-1.98)  
Disp -18.136**  -2.027  -4.716  6.898***  
 (-2.16)  (-0.75)  (-0.85)  (3.13)  
Disp*D_posNAV 19.710**  1.882  -11.612  -8.909**  
 (2.42)  (0.51)  (-1.37)  (-2.22)  
Trading  -16.778**  0.304  0.554  2.514** 
  (-2.52)  (0.33)  (0.51)  (2.33) 
Trading*D_posNAV  12.511**  0.028  0.611  -3.328** 
  (2.05)  (0.02)  (0.45)  (-1.99) 
D_posNAV -1.809* -1.557* -0.778 -0.753 -0.064 -0.243 0.119 0.128 
 (-1.84) (-1.68) (-1.34) (-1.51) (-0.15) (-0.65) (0.14) (0.14) 
Constant 7.513 5.601 -0.218 -0.434 8.602** 8.662** 3.248 2.297 
 (1.51) (1.14) (-0.05) (-0.10) (2.07) (2.57) (0.77) (0.60) 
         
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ptype FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 
Pseudo R-squared 0.467 0.455 0.366 0.360 0.319 0.280 0.456 0.429 
 
Note: Table 7 reports the probit regression result of equation (7). We test the Efficient Asset Allocation hypothesis using D_posNAV as the channel 
dummy variable. Control variables are not shown in the table but are included in every estimation. Each estimation includes year fixed effects and 
property-type fixed effects. Based on the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance for the estimated 
coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. Error terms are clustered by firm and robust to both heteroskedasticity and 
within-firm correlation.
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Table 8  Property Transaction and Credit Rating Change: Testing Efficient Asset Allocation (ROAA) 
Dependent variable: Upgrade Upgrade Downgrade Downgrade Positive Positive Negative Negative 
Model# (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Acq -3.560**  1.631*  1.119  1.128  
 (-1.97)  (1.71)  (0.86)  (1.20)  
Acq*D_incROAA 3.175  -2.480  0.488  1.762  
 (1.30)  (-1.40)  (0.28)  (0.85)  
Disp -2.478  0.867  -8.912*  4.370  
 (-0.41)  (0.21)  (-1.90)  (1.25)  
Disp*D_incROAA 3.154  0.024  0.649  2.166  
 (0.64)  (0.01)  (0.16)  (0.55)  
Trading  -3.455*  1.552*  0.339  1.583** 
  (-1.83)  (1.85)  (0.24)  (1.99) 
Trading*D_incROAA  3.268*  -1.481  -0.003  2.201 
  (1.65)  (-1.05)  (-0.00)  (1.47) 
D_incROAA -0.571 -0.557 0.173 0.182 0.375 0.281 -0.589 -0.593 
 (-1.57) (-1.47) (0.35) (0.40) (0.93) (0.67) (-1.19) (-1.25) 
Constant 0.779 0.687 -1.471 -1.175 6.059* 4.956 -3.668 -3.925 
 
(0.21) (0.18) (-0.45) (-0.34) (1.94) (1.64) (-1.08) (-1.22) 
         
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ptype FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 266 266 266         266 266 266         266     266 
Pseudo R-squared 0.221 0.220 0.286          0.284 0.226 0.175        0.404     0.395 
 
Note: Table 8 reports the probit regression result of equation (7). We test the Efficient Asset Allocation hypothesis using D_incROAA as the channel 
dummy variable. Control variables are not shown in the table but are included in every estimation. Each estimation includes year fixed effects and 
property-type fixed effects. Based on the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance for the estimated 
coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. Error terms are clustered by firm and robust to both heteroskedasticity and 
within-firm correlation. 
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Table 9  Property Transaction and Credit Rating Change: Testing Proceeds Utilization 
Dependent variable: Upgrade Upgrade Downgrade Downgrade Positive  Positive  Negative Negative 
Model# (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Acq 1.608  0.849  1.687  1.822**  
 (1.36)  (0.70)  (1.30)  (2.20)  
Acq*D_decLeverage 6.391***  2.154  -0.545  -1.824  
 (2.88)  (1.22)  (-0.32)  (-0.82)  
Disp -1.832  -0.238  -3.660  6.197***  
 (-0.55)  (-0.11)  (-0.82)  (3.26)  
Disp*D_decLeverage 3.139  -17.009***  10.115**  -3.284  
 (0.91)  (-2.63)  (2.51)  (-0.96)  
Trading  1.087  1.039  1.310  2.771*** 
  (1.15)  (1.23)  (0.99)  (3.48) 
Trading*D_decLeverage  4.112**  0.480  1.487  -1.766 
  (2.56)  (0.29)  (0.86)  (-1.17) 
D_decLeverage 0.642 0.837 -1.361** -1.541** 0.921* 0.714 -0.734 -0.811 
 (1.17) (1.45) (-1.97) (-2.33) (1.95) (1.53) (-0.84) (-0.94) 
Constant -0.076 -0.406 -0.117 -0.118 5.226* 4.749 -3.690 -3.801 
 (-0.02) (-0.11) (-0.03) (-0.04) (1.76) (1.56) (-1.16) (-1.21) 
         
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ptype FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 
Pseudo R-squared 0.245 0.226 0.345 0.321 0.234 0.180 0.428 0.414 
 
Note: Table 9 reports the probit regression result of equation (7). We test the Proceeds Utilization hypothesis using D_decLeverage as the channel 
dummy variable. Control variables are not shown in the table but are included in every estimation. Each estimation includes year fixed effects and 
property-type fixed effects. Based on the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance for the estimated 
coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. Error terms are clustered by firm and robust to both heteroskedasticity and 
within-firm correlation.
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Table 10  Property Transaction and Credit Rating Change: Testing Focus 
Dependent variable: Upgrade Upgrade Downgrade Downgrade Positive  Positive  Negative Negative 
Model# (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Acq -0.487  0.716  -3.096**  2.986**  
 (-0.38) 
 (0.55)  (-2.42)  (2.17)  
Acq*D_incHHIgeo 0.051  -0.219  -2.160  -1.297  
 (0.03) 
 (-0.11)  (-1.12)  (-0.57)  
Disp -8.478*  4.540*  -3.775  0.472  
 (-1.65) 
 (1.69)  (-0.58)  (0.20)  
Disp*D_incHHIgeo -12.844**  7.625*  -5.129  5.230  
 (-2.37) 
 (1.79)  (-1.13)  (1.27)  
Trading  -0.141  1.098  -2.701**  2.763** 
 
 (-0.12)  (1.05)  (-2.21)  (2.11) 
Trading*D_incHHIgeo  -0.884  2.534  -3.495  0.458 
 
 (-0.65)  (1.40)  (-1.53)  (0.24) 
D_incHHIgeo 0.179 -0.243 0.849* 0.704 0.643 0.615 -0.628 -0.421 
 (0.37) (-0.61) (1.72) (1.47) (1.62) (1.41) (-1.45) (-1.03) 
Constant -1.212 -2.034 -1.962 -1.475 8.135*** 8.014*** -10.007** -9.898** 
 (-0.29) (-0.43) (-0.51) (-0.38) (2.74) (2.58) (-2.00) (-2.04) 
 
        
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ptype FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
Pseudo R-squared 0.277 0.242 0.314 0.304 0.253 0.226 0.501 0.496 
 
Note: Table 10 reports the probit regression result of equation (7). We test the Focus hypothesis using D_incHHIgeo as the channel dummy variable. 
Control variables are not shown in the table but are included in every estimation. Each estimation includes year fixed effects and property-type fixed 
effects. Based on the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance for the estimated coefficient at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. Error terms are clustered by firm and robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. 
